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Regulation of any ﬁ  nancial institution or asset class should reﬂ  ect the regulatory objectives which are 
relevant to the institution or asset class. This paper identiﬁ  es the relevant regulatory objectives in respect 
of hedge funds as market conﬁ  dence and ﬁ  nancial stability, market integrity and consumer protection. 
Against these objectives, the paper examines what information should – and should not – be provided by 
hedge fund managers to:
• investors
• creditors and counterparties
• the general public
• regulators
It also describes the work carried out by the Financial Services Authority (FSA), in the context of its market 
conﬁ  dence and ﬁ  nancial stability objective, to survey large dealers’ exposure to hedge funds and the 
risk-based supervision of UK hedge fund managers carried out by the FSA in the United Kingdom.
NB: The author wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Michael Ainley, Andrew Shrimpton, Duncan Sloan, Nicholas Newland, Andy Murﬁ  n, Andrea Pack, 
Mike Duignan, Hector Sants and Thomas Huertas (UK Financial Services Authority – FSA)ARTICLES
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M
uch of the recent debate about hedge funds 
has circled around the contention that 
greater transparency is needed for hedge 
funds – the importance of appropriate transparency 
has been highlighted by recent events on Wall Street. 
Unfortunately, there has been less discussion 
of what “greater transparency” implies: what 
information should be required; from whom should 
the information be sought; and to whom should it be 
made available. This paper seeks to bring deﬁ  nition 
to the debate about transparency for hedge funds by 
advancing answers to these questions.
It should be an uncontentious precept that 
transparency –the availability of information– is 
not an end in itself, but a means of achieving some 
other goal. In relation to hedge funds, we believe 
three main regulatory issues arise, which determine 
the context for what transparency should achieve. 
The three regulatory issues are:
• market conﬁ  dence and ﬁ  nancial stability: the 
risk that failure of one or more hedge funds would 
trigger a systemic risk to ﬁ  nancial markets, and 
hence a risk to ﬁ  nancial stability;
• market integrity: the risk that hedge fund managers do 
not observe the correct standards of market conduct;
• consumer protection: the risk that investors will 
be treated unfairly.
We recognise, of course, that there are wider political 
issues associated with hedge funds, but choose to 
treat these as beyond the scope of regulators. We also 
recognise that hedge funds fall within the scope of wider 
transparency requirements of a general nature, such 
as the major shareholding notiﬁ  cation requirements of 
the Transparency Directive, applicable to all investors. 
We take it as axiomatic that any applicable general 
requirements of this nature will apply to hedge funds.
Against this background, this paper examines what 
information should be sought by:
• investors
• creditors and counterparties




The Financial Services Authority (FSA) has 
a statutory objective of ensuring appropriate 
consumer protection. This embraces consumer 
protection for those who invest in hedge funds. 
In particular, we wish to ensure that investors in 
hedge funds receive information which enables 
them to make informed investment decisions, 
and that conﬂ   icts of interest within hedge 
fund managers are managed adequately. The 
information which we believe to be useful for 
investors is described below.
1|1 Offering  memorandum
The offering memorandum for a hedge fund should 
provide information on the following areas:
• fees: in common with other asset managers, 
hedge fund managers should set out clearly the 
basis on which they will charge fees. This should 
cover not only the basic structure (the classic 
“2 per cent + 20 per cent”), but should be explicit 
in deﬁ  ning the various parameters on which the 
management and performance fees are calculated: 
hurdle rates, allowable expenses and equalisation 
structure are examples. The body responsible for 
calculating the fees against these parameters should 
be deﬁ  ned;
• redemption policy: it is clearly important that 
investors should be told the terms under which they 
can redeem funds, and what limitations apply to 
redemption. A particular concern, discussed in greater 
detail below, is that the existence of any preferential 
redemption rights should also be disclosed;
• investment strategy: hedge fund managers should 
deﬁ  ne the investment strategy they intend to pursue, 
and the extent of any discretion for the manager to 
vary those policies. A feature of the development of 
hedge funds has been the extent to which particular 
strategies are being deﬁ  ned: “long/short equity”, 
“global macro”, “event driven” etc.ARTICLES
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1|2  Regular investor reporting
Most hedge fund managers communicate with 
investors through monthly or quarterly newsletters. 
Whilst these newsletters vary in content depending 
on such factors as the fund’s strategy, they usually 
contain items such as performance commentary, 
sector or geographic exposure breakdown and the 
managers’ view on the outlook for the fund. They may 
also contain information on the largest holdings of 
the fund and risk information, such as risk metrics.
1|3  Rating agencies and databases
There are other institutions that can help investors in 
performing due diligence of hedge funds and hedge 
fund managers. A number of market providers are 
currently rating or proposing to rate hedge funds or 
their managers. In addition, there is a developing 
industry in funds of hedge funds that are essentially 
providing a fund selection and due diligence service 
for potential investors.
It is important, however, to recognise that the most 
probable contribution of rating agencies in relation to 
hedge funds will be in assessing the fund manager’s 
processes –valuation, audit, risk management– rather 
than performing the traditional task of a rating agency, 
namely assessing the likelihood of default. The FSA’s 
discussions with rating agencies suggest that hedge 
fund managers, and their administrative processes, 
rather than the probability of default of the hedge fund 
itself, will be the centre of rating agency interest.
Commercial databases provide a further useful 
source of information on topics such as fund 
performance, manager information, and assets under 
management, fees, prime brokers and auditors.
1|4  Where investor disclosure 
  should be improved
Although investor disclosure has increased over 
recent years, we consider there are four areas where 
transparency should be improved.
ADEQUATE DISCLOSURE OF PROCEDURES
FOR VALUATION OF COMPLEX/ILLIQUID INSTRUMENTS
The difﬁ   culty of valuing positions in illiquid 
assets and markets, or in circumstances where no 
independent, objectively veriﬁ  able, screen prices 
are available is a general problem across ﬁ  nancial 
markets, including hedge funds. Valuation errors 
can lead to investor detriment and in extreme 
cases fraud can result from deliberately misleading 
valuations. The FSA has investor protection and, in 
the extreme cases, ﬁ  nancial crime concerns in this 
area. As a result, the FSA has been at the forefront 
of work among regulators on the issue of valuations 
and strongly supports the work of International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) 
on this issue. The FSA has completed thematic 
work in this area and has submitted its views on 
good practice to IOSCO. Details are available on 
the FSA’s website. In short, hedge fund managers 
should set out the basis on which their funds are 
valued. This should start by establishing whether 
there is an independent valuation of the fund, 
but there is a need to go substantially beyond 
this, to cover policies and procedures such as the 
separation of duties between portfolio managers 
and back ofﬁ   ces; the reconciliation of values 
between hedge fund manager, prime broker and 
administrator; price sources; and procedures for 
dispute settlement.
The issue of valuations clearly occurs within hedge 
funds, but should be recognised as a general problem 
in the wider ﬁ  nancial industry. The issue should 
be considered wherever it occurs, not simply or 
principally in the context of hedge funds.
MAKING INVESTORS AWARE OF SIDE LETTERS
WITH “MATERIAL” TERMS
There has been a practice among some hedge fund 
managers to grant material preferential terms to 
some (typically large) investors. Such material 
terms may, for example, grant preferred investors 
better investment liquidity terms or enhanced 
transparency. Such preferential treatment has 
typically been conferred through the use of side 
letters, which have often not been disclosed to ARTICLES
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other investors. These preferred terms are likely to 
be to the detriment of other investors in the hedge 
funds. The FSA regards this lack of transparency 
as unacceptable and expects the existence of side 
letters with material terms to be disclosed, so that all 
investors are made aware of their position, whether 
preferred or otherwise.
The FSA has worked constructively with hedge 
fund managers and the Alternative Investment 
Management Association to agree both what 
constitutes a material term and appropriate 
notiﬁ  cation methods to ensure that all investors are 
aware of the presence of side letters with material 
terms in the funds they invest in. We are currently 
conducting thematic work to establish conformity 
with the FSA’s principles.
DISCLOSURE OF OPERATIONAL RISK
Some hedge fund managers commission external 
reviews of their systems and controls. We see 
advantage when such a review occurs in its being 
made available to investors.
DISCLOSURE OF FUND RISK POLICIES
The FSA has worked to raise the standards of risk 
disclosure to investors, by requiring hedge fund 
managers to document adequately the risk policies 
they adopt. We believe this should be disclosed to 
investors.
2| T RANSPARENCY FOR CREDITORS
AND COUNTERPARTIES
The FSA, in relation to its responsibilities for ﬁ  nancial 
stability, has paid particular attention to the creditors 
and counterparties of hedge funds, concentrating on 
the prime brokers who provide hedge funds with 
ﬁ  nancial and operational gearing. We have taken this 
approach not, as some believe, because the brokers 
are subject to regulation and hedge fund managers 
are free of regulation. In the United Kingdom, both 
brokers and hedge fund managers are subject to 
regulation. Rather the FSA’s approach is based on 
the belief that information about the prime brokers’ 
exposure to and knowledge of their hedge fund 
manager clients is the most useful information for 
our purposes.
The FSA carries out a six monthly survey of the 
large dealers’ exposures to hedge funds across the 
range of their business. We examine the prime 
brokerage exposure and counterparty credit 
exposures to hedge funds of some 15 ﬁ  nancial 
institutions. The information gathered from these 
major counterparties to hedge funds covers more 
than the immediate prime broker business. It also 
includes (where relevant) exposures in relation to 
repos, FX, credit derivative and energy derivative 
business. Where possible, we check this information 
against the exposure (of the group of which the prime 
broker is a member) to the hedge fund. The data 
requirements are broadly to identify credit exposure 
to hedge funds and to examine the relationship 
between prime broker and hedge fund manager. The 
data is both in aggregate and top 10 fund data format. 
For the prime brokerage business, the top 10 fund 
data is compiled on the basis of cash balance and 
margin requirement; this generates more detailed 
data on 154 funds and 180 individual exposures. 
From this, we assess factors such as net equity, 
long/short market value and excess collateral. This 
helps us gauge the risk appetite of both the hedge 
funds and prime brokers covered by the survey, 
identify any outliers for further supervisory work, 
identify hedge funds of growing importance, and 
assess the ability of the dealers to manage, across 
their business units, their counterparty exposure. The 
results of our survey are fed back to the ﬁ  rms through 
the London Investment Bankers Association.
The latest survey for which we have data was carried 
out in October 2006. The points we would draw from 
it are:
• hedge funds to which these broker/dealers are 
exposed are continuing to grow strongly, with assets 
under management in total (on an equity basis) now 
USD 660 billion;
• according to the data in our survey, the prime 
brokerage market share is dominated by three prime 
brokers;
• aggregate leverage in prime brokerage (calculated as 
long market positions divided by net equity) decreased 
slightly between April 2006 and October 2006 from ARTICLES
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1.86 times to 1.66 times. By way of comparison, 
Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) routinely 
operated on a long leverage of 25 times, and, as it 
approached crisis, more than 50 times;
• average excess collateral increased slightly from 
86% to 91% between April and October 2006;
• contrary to the view that funds divide and rule 
between many broker dealers, from our October 2006 
survey, only 20 of the 154 funds within the prime 
brokerage survey were identiﬁ  ed more than once. 
It follows that many funds’ prime brokers may have 
full daily transparency of positions and should be 
able to do their own risk modelling;
•  5 of 180 individual exposures within prime 
brokerage were on margin call, representing only 
0.3 per cent of total individual exposures.
The survey has highlighted elements which we 
believe merit further enquiry, notably collateral 
practices and margin calculations, which we are 
looking at in a joint exercise with the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York and the SEC. We are also trying 
to extend the database we have from UK to global 
information. Our measurements are mostly, but not 
exclusively, of UK exposure: where we have global 
data they are consistent with the UK data.
Prime brokers assess hedge fund exposures on a daily 
basis using proprietary systems and methods in order 
to calculate initial and variation margin. The prime 
brokers monitor daily mark to market valuation 
changes; calculate initial margins for new positions; 
assess risk exposures to the fund by applying stress 
tests based on various market scenarios; and assess 
performance, performance volatility and net asset 
value (measured against their potential exposure 
and stress test exposures). Prime brokers can only 
assess their individual exposure to funds, based on 
the portfolio they are prime brokering and lending 
against. They cannot observe the same hedge 
funds’ exposures to other prime brokers, which 
is a potential weakness in their ability to assess 
fund concentration risk across an entire portfolio. 
Typically, prime brokers are the calculation agent 
for margin and collateral purposes, so funds must 
meet the exposure mitigation requirements assessed 
by the prime broker.
Non-prime brokerage trading activities with hedge 
funds (over-the-counter derivatives, repo, FX) also 
require that ﬁ  rms implement daily monitoring of risk 
exposures in order to calculate collateral coverage 
for unsecured counterparty credit exposures, and 
to calculate initial and variation margins for trades 
where the ﬁ  rm is offering ﬁ  nancing. Firms try and 
set margin so that potential exposures are reduced 
to zero. Firms offer margin based on a transparent 
rules-based method depending on the underlying 
product, its liquidity and term (and based on internal 
guidance on fund credit ratings). Some of the larger 
funds will accept VaR-based margining, stress 
test-based margining, and portfolio margining (which 
has portfolio diversiﬁ  cation  beneﬁ   ts for funds), 
but have to accept the ﬁ  rms’ volatility inputs and 
VaR models. Small funds will typically receive 
rules-based margining.
When practising due diligence on hedge funds to 
determine their creditworthiness, lenders give a 
variety of weightings to different factors. Factor 
weightings in the rating model generally give fund 
transparency a lower weighting than quantitative 
factors such as: leverage, strategy, net asset value 
(NAV), volatility of returns, diversiﬁ  cation, investor 
base, redemptions, performance and liquidity 
(unencumbered cash, gates and margin lock-ups).
Both the FSA and the industry are seeking to improve 
practices of disclosure and margining. The FSA is 
looking to ensure that creditors and prime brokers 
have the systems, controls and processes to control 
their credit exposures to hedge funds as well as other 
counterparties. The FSA supervises this area with a 
combination of its prime brokerage survey and the 
“close and continuous” relationship the FSA has with 
the large investment banks.
3| FUND HOLDING TRANSPARENCY
TO THE PUBLIC
There are some who argue that hedge funds should 
disclose publicly their holdings – either in equities 
and corporate bonds for reasons associated with the 
inﬂ  uence they might exercise over companies, or 
their more general positions. The FSA is strongly ARTICLES
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opposed to a general requirement for hedge funds 
(or other asset managers or proprietary traders) to 
disclose positions, either to regulators or to the general 
public. We know of no convincing explanation which 
has been advanced as to what use any regulatory 
organisation would in practice put repeated reports 
on positions, and believe that the gathering of 
information by regulators which is not used is bad 
practice. It encourages investors and commentators 
to believe that some security is being achieved when 
none is; and it exposes the regulatory organisation to 
justiﬁ  ed criticism. And we also oppose the disclosure 
of positions to the public as a whole (whether by 
hedge funds or by others) as likely to prove damaging 
rather than supportive of ﬁ  nancial stability.
The position in respect of disclosure of equity 
holdings which we advocate is quite simply the 
same requirements for hedge funds as for other 
investors. Once an investor acquires a certain 
percentage of an issuers’ equity they are bound 
by the Major Shareholder Notiﬁ   cation of the 
Transparency Directive (TD). The FSA believes that 
the transparency provided by the Major Shareholder 
Notiﬁ  cation regime maintains market conﬁ  dence 
and price efﬁ  ciency as the management of both the 
issuer and investors are able to take more informed 
decisions, including decisions on the value of the 
securities, based on the identity of and amounts held 
by substantial shareholders.
The TD was implemented on the 20 January 2007 
and has broadly harmonised across Europe the 
requirements to disclose information regarding 
issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on 
a regulated market. It has been designed to enhance 
transparency on EU capital markets by requiring 
regulated market issuers to produce periodic ﬁ  nancial 
reports and shareholders in such companies to 
disclose major holdings. The TD also deals with the 
mechanisms through which this information is to be 
disseminated to the public and stored. The directive 
is a minimum harmonisation directive which allows 
the home Member State of regulated market issuers 
to impose more stringent requirements than those 
set out in the directive while restricting the host 
Member State to the minimum TD requirements.
The most relevant part of the directive in relation to 
hedge fund transparency is the Major Shareholder 
Notiﬁ   cation regime. The FSA consulted on its 
implementation of the TD in March 2006. On the 
Major Shareholder Notiﬁ  cation  requirements, 
respondents were offered the option of keeping 
the broad parameters of the current UK regime 
which were super-equivalent to the directive 
or reverting to the TD minimum requirements. 
Respondents overwhelmingly supported retaining the 
UK super-equivalent position, arguing on balance 
that greater transparency for issuers, investors and 
the market as a whole outweighed the costs of making 
a far greater number of disclosures under the UK 
regime and so this is how the FSA has implemented 
the directive.
One issue, particularly relevant but not unique to 
hedge funds managers, is the disclosure of derivative 
positions, as well as those of actual physical holdings 
of shares. The FSA has powers to extend the Major 
Shareholder Notiﬁ  cation regime beyond the current 
disclosure of “ownership” of equity positions to 
require the disclosure of “economic interests” in 
shares through derivatives such as contracts for 
differences (CFDs). We have not introduced such 
rules alongside the rules implementing the TD. We 
have discussed with market participants and asked 
more generally for views. Respondents indicated that 
they would welcome an FSA initiative to investigate 
this disclosure issue further. However, there is no 
consensus as to the need for such disclosure or how 
in practice a disclosure regime might work.
We have identiﬁ  ed three potential market failures that 
might arise as a consequence of the non-disclosure 
of economic interests:
• Inefﬁ  cient pricing in the equity market as a result of 
information asymmetries. In the situation where some 
investors have superior information on ownership 
structure than others, they may be able to trade on the 
basis of this information advantage to the detriment 
of the less-informed investors. This presumes that 
information on ownership information (e.g. identity 
and structure) is of value to investors when making 
their decisions to trade. This assumption underpins 
existing major shareholder notiﬁ  cations, and it is 
reasonable to consider whether information on 
signiﬁ  cant CFD positions may also be of value;
• The risk of stealth takeovers by predatory investors using 
CFDs to bypass the Major Shareholder Notiﬁ  cation Rules.
With a view to a takeover, potential acquirers could 
target a ﬁ  rm by entering into a CFD with a bank. The 
bank could then buy the target’s equity as a hedge. ARTICLES
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Transparency is not an end in itself, but should be pursued when it contributes to achieving other purposes 
– ﬁ  nancial stability, investor protection or improved market conduct. This article has attempted to identify 
what information is already available; what further information should be made available, and to whom; 
and what information should not be required.
The acquirer could then close the CFD position, buy 
the equity which the bank is holding and thus acquire 
a large stake in the company – therefore surprising 
both the issuer and the market. The bank may have 
strong incentives to sell the equity to the acquirer if 
the acquirer wants it because a large equity position 
may be difﬁ  cult to unwind and the acquirer may be a 
willing buyer able to offer a good price.
• Weakened market conﬁ  dence as a consequence of the 
lack of transparency as to the identity of investors with 
an undisclosed interest in a company. This means 
investors may be deterred from participating in the 
market if they feel uncertain as to the players or 
hidden activities.
We are currently unclear on the extent or signiﬁ  cance 
of these market failures or to the potential costs 
and beneﬁ  ts of a disclosure regime. We have been 
provided with anecdotal evidence of disquiet about 
the present position but it has been more difﬁ  cult to 
identify clear cut empirical evidence which support 
the arguments cited. And, against the concern 
for more disclosure, such a disclosure regime of 
economic interests would be complex in nature, not 
easy to interpret and expensive to administer.
The Takeover Panel introduced new rules in 2005 
requiring disclosure of dealings in derivatives and 
options (including CFDs) during offer periods only. 
Arguably, these may be the circumstances when 
increased CFD disclosure is most relevant. There 
is therefore an argument that the Takeover Panel’s 
rules have already addressed the problems of any 
possible market failures resulting from stake building 
in derivative interests, and as such any further 
regulatory intervention would be unnecessary and
overly burdensome.
Before we make a decision as to what policy line 
to follow, we intend to undertake further analysis 
of the effect of disclosure of CFDs on the market. 
We will explore the nature and scale of any market 
failure that exists at present and the cost/beneﬁ  ts 
and practicalities of differing CFD disclosure regimes 
and models.